ABSTRACT RC4(n, m) is a stream cipher based on RC4 and is designed by G. Gong et al.. It can be seen as a generalization of the famous RC4 stream cipher designed by Ron Rivest. The authors of RC4(n, m) claim that the cipher resists all the attacks that are successful against the original RC4. The paper reveals cryptographic weaknesses of the RC4(n, m) stream cipher. We develop two attacks. The first one is based on non-randomness of internal state and allows to distinguish it from a truly random cipher by an algorithm that has access to 2 4·n bits of the keystream. The second attack exploits low diffusion of bits in the KSA and PRGA algorithms and recovers all bytes of the secret key. This attack works only if the initial value of the cipher can be manipulated. Apart from the secret key, the cipher uses two other inputs, namely, initial value and initial vector. Although these inputs are fixed in the cipher specification, some applications may allow the inputs to be under the attacker control. Assuming that the attacker can control the initial value, we show a distinguisher for the cipher and a secret key recovery attack that for the L-bit secret key, is able to recover it with about (L/n) · 2 n steps. The attack has been implemented on a standard PC and can reconstruct the secret key of RC(8,32) in less than a second.
INTRODUCTION
The well-known AES block cipher standard is widely used to protect communication. However, in many applications, where computing resources are limited, cryptographic algorithms of choice are stream ciphers. They offer high speed and can be adapted to specific implementation requirements. The cryptographic community has assisted the business and industry alike by providing a wide range of stream ciphers. One of such ciphers is RC4 designed in 1987 by Ron Rivest. The cipher uses a large internal state that is stored in an array of words. Because of a simplicity of design and a high speed offered by software implementation, the cipher has gained popularity in many internet applications such as TLS/SSL and WEP.
In fact, RC4 is a family of stream ciphers indexed by an integer n that indicates the size of the word in bits. The internal state is an array S of 2 n words. RC4 consists of two algorithms. The first is a key scheduling algorithm (KSA) and it initialises the internal state. The second is a pseudorandom generation algorithm (PRGA). It generates the output keystream. The KSA algorithm takes an array S and a secret key K and produces the initial state or a secret permutation of {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2 n − 1}. The PRGA algorithm accepts the initial state S and produces a sequence of words -one word per clock. A popular instantiation of RC4 is for n = 8. In this instantiation, words are 8-bit long and the array S contains 2 8 = 256 entries. The security of RC4 has been extensively studied. The key schedule of RC4 is examined in [3, 12, 13, 16, 18, 21] . Distinguishing attacks are presented in [4, 5, 13, 14, 19] . The internal state recovery attacks are investigated in [11, 15] .
When the parameter n is bigger, for instance n = 32, the implementation requires more memory and, in general, the cipher becomes slower. On the positive side, one would expect that the cipher is going to be stronger. This line of investigations resulted in several generalizations of RC4-like stream ciphers, see for example RC4A [18] , VMPC [23] , NGG [17] and RC4(n, m) [6] . Our attention is concentrated on the Gong et al. design given in [6] . In this cipher the state array S no longer consists of 2 n entries. Consequently the state is no longer a permutation. This cipher is called RC4(n, m), where the state array consists 2 n entries (words) and each word is m-bit long (n < m). For a 32−bit architecture, the recommended parameter values are n = 8 and m = 32.
RC4(n, m) is a fast synchronous stream cipher proposed by Guang Gong, Kishan Chand Gupta, Martin Hell and Yassir Nawaz in [6] . RC4(n, m) produces m bits per clock. The main idea to design RC4(n, m) is to exploit the 32-bit and 64-bit processor architectures without increasing the size of the table significantly. The internal state size of RC4(n, m) is (2 n m) + 2n + m bit long, since it consists of an array of 2 n entries and each entry takes m bits , one m-bit variable k and two n-bit indexes i and j. Note that the key length is proposed up to 8192 bits but the security is provided for keys of size up to 256 bits.
Previous Works
RC4(n, m) has been proposed based on a 32-bit RC4-like stream cipher [17] by Y. Nawaz, K.C. Gupta, and G. Gong called the NGG Stream Cipher to improve the security of the cipher against the proposed attacks. H. Wu proposed a distinguishing attack on NGG [22] , which could distinguish the keystream outputs from random sequences with about 3200 output bits. Also, in [8] , a new distinguisher and a key recovery attack on the cipher has been proposed. The attack can distinguish the cipher from a random stream using only the first keystream word. Attacker also can recover the secret key by exploiting leaked information from the first few kilobytes of the keystream output. But the story about the new version called RC4(n, m) or GGHN is different 1 . Note that all the above proposed attacks on NGG are not applicable to RC4(n, m).
To our best knowledge, there are few attacks on RC4(n, m). Paul and Preneel have proposed a distinguishing attack that needs 2 32.89 output keystream words to distinguish the cipher from a random source [19] . The second attack [20] proposed by Tsunoo, Saito, Kubo, and Suzaki is a distinguishing attack, which uses the bias along with the first two words of a keystream associated with approximately 2 30 secret keys. In the attack, the authors explore the correlation between indices and entries of the array. The third attack proposed by Kircanski and Youssef [9] is a fault attack, which extracts the internal state of the cipher by applying induced faults. The attack also needs 2 keystream words for each of 257 × 255 induced faults and approximately 257 non-faulted keystream words.
Our Contributions
We study security of RC4(n, m). We show several weaknesses in the initialization part and the update function of the algorithm. Two distinguishing attacks are described. The first attack takes advantage of the bias of least significant bits of the internal state. The idea of this attack is similar to [19, 20] but we apply it to the key scheduling algorithm. The second attack is based on truncated differentials and requires 256 output words only. Finally, we will present a key recovery attack, which is able to find 256-bit secret keys with time complexity about 2 13 algorithm operations for RC4 (8, 32) . The current state of analysis of RC4(n, m) is summarized in Table 1 .
In application protocols like WEP(Wired Equivalent Privacy), there is a session-dependent initial value that needs to be introduced as input to the stream cipher to produce different pseudo-random streams for different sessions. In these protocols, the attacker can often manipulate the initial value, as for example in the attack [3] on RC4 used in the WEP protocol, and exploit a chosen IV attack model to investigate the security of the scheme. Consequently, for such applications, the stream cipher needs to be designed to accept initial value inputs, and its security needs to be assessed with respect to initial value inputs chosen by the attacker. RC4(n, m) also uses three input parameters ( Figure  1 ): secret key, initial vector, and initial value (to initialise internal state before applying the key scheduling algorithm). From a practical point of view, the system designer may exploit all the features of the crypto-algorithm to enhance better efficiency. In this case, using initial value and initial vector as variable input parameters to differentiate applications and also to increase the security level may seem to be reasonable in the first glance. We study the extreme misuse of RC4(n, m) when the initial value is assumed to be under the attacker control. The protocol initial value could be incorporated in two ways: either as the "initial value" input to the KSA* module, or as part of the secret key input (using a hash function) as the authors of RC4(m,n) proposed. From the implementation point of view, the first option might be tempting since it may be simpler to implement. For the sake of clarity, we assume that the attacker is able to change the initial value. In this case, we prove the cipher is surprisingly insecure against the distinguishing and key recovery attacks. We also note that the attacks (5) and (6) in Table 1 are not applicable when the attacker is not allowed to manipulate the initial value. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of initialisation and key generation part of the scheme. Section 3 is the main part of the work, which contains our distinguishing and key recovery attacks.
DESCRIPTION OF RC4(N,M) STREAM CIPHER
The RC4(n, m) stream cipher uses the building blocks defined for the RC4 stream cipher. These blocks, however, are modified by the authors. We first describe the original key scheduling algorithm of RC4 and then we give the modified algorithm of RC4(n, m). A general illustration of RC4(n, m) is presented in Figure 1 . Attack is applied on RC4(n, m) 6 our proposed Differential attack Secret Key Recovery 2 n × 2 n output words corresponding to two initial vectors to recover each key byte
where L is secret key length in bit Attack is applied on RC4(n, m) The algorithm is described in Figure 2 . The algorithms of RC4(n, m) are called KSA* and PRGA* to distinguish them from KSA and PRGA, respectively. To recall, the parameters of RC4(n, m) are defined as follows. The size of the state array is N = 2 n and each entry of the array holds m bits. Entries are going to be called words. We define a constant M = 2 m . For example, RC4(8, 32) means that the size of the array S is 256 and each entry of S holds 32-bit words.
• KSA* (the key scheduling algorithm of RC4(n, m)) -the algorithm takes a secret key 2 of a size between 40 and 256 bits and the state array as the input and returns an updated internal state stored in the array S and variable k. The full details are given in • PRGA* (the pseudo-random generation algorithm) -it takes the pair: the internal state S and variable k as the input and generates output keystream words. The pseudo-code of the algorithm is given in Figure 4 .
Notations
[X]0 is the least significant bit of the word X.
[X]i,...,j are (j − i + 1) consecutive bits of word X started from the position of i − th to j − th. 
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5 end for 6 j = 0;
8 Repeat r times;
14 end for In this section, we prove that RC4(n, m) is not resistant against distinguishing and key recovery attacks. First, we are going to identify weaknesses in the KSA* algorithm. Next, we exploit these weaknesses and show how to distinguish the output stream of RC4(n, m) from a random cipher. The data complexity of the attack is 256 output words. Then, we propose a key recovery attack based on truncated differentials. The time complexity attack to recover a 256-bit secret key of RC4(8, 32) is about 2 13 algorithm operations.
Note that in most applications the initial values are fixed and cannot be manipulated but in the midnight or lunch time attacks, this is no longer true. An adversary may have full access to all public inputs (such the initial value input) and can try to discover the secret values of the cipher by modifying all or a part of public inputs.
Weaknesses of RC4(n,m)
Before describing our attacks, we discuss properties of the RC4(n, m) that underpin our attacks.
Non-Randomness Property of Internal States
The array S has 256 elements whose lengths are 32 bits and the pointer j takes one byte. This means that if we choose two indices i, j ∈ {0, 1} 8 at random, then the probability P r(S[i] = S[j]) = P r(i = j) = 2 −8 assuming that S[i] = S[j] for i = j, while for two random 32-bit words, this probability is 2 −32 . Now, we can prove that for every element in the array S after applying initialization algorithm, P r([S[i]]0 = 0) = 0.5 + 2 −8 , where 0 < i < 256. Example Let internal states of algorithm be equal to the values suggested in the appendix A in [6] , and the secret key is 0X0101 ... 01. According to the KSA algorithm, we can write the following relations:
Weak Keys
The above relations show that in RC4(n, m), there are Finney states [7] 
Weak States
We are going to find several initial states, for which the outputs will be distinguishable from a truly random source. The main weak point, which we exploit here, is a low diffusion of bits in KSA*.
1. For an arbitrary secret key, if the least significant bits of initial states are equal to zero, then the least significant bits of keystreams will be zero with the probability one. We can extend this observation for 2, 3, ..., 32-bit of LSB of initial states.
Assume that
then j will be equal to i in the first round. It means that after one round, all the internal states will be even (the least significant bits of internal states will always be zero).
Suppose that K[0] is odd and
, then the internal states after one round will be even. In other words, the least significant bit of keystreams will be always zero.
Low Diffusion Property
Clearly, the update function of RC4(n, m) is like a T-function [10] . It means that the i-th bit of output depends on the i-th bit of input and all less significant bits (i.e. bits i − 1, . . . , 0) of the input. This is a serious weakness for RC4(n, m), because if the cryptanalyst changes the most significant bits of initial values (ai) in KSA*, then only the most significant bits of keystreams will be changed (other bits will be unchanged). In the RC4 initialization algorithm, all bytes of initial state and secret key are involved to provide internal state as input for PRGA to generate output keystream. This means that by complementing one bit of initial state, all bits of output key streams will be changed with probability close to 1/2. In fact, this property called the avalanche criterion is one of the most essential properties of a secure cipher. However, this property has been confirmed only for the least significant bytes of initial value array. In other words, if we change the I−th bit (32 > I ≥ 8), then more significant bits i may change (i > I), while less significant bits (with index i < I) are not going to change. Now, we are ready to describe the proposed attacks on RC4(n, m).
Distinguishing Attack on RC4(n,m)

The first attack
This attack is based on the non-randomness property of internal states, which is described in the previous section. Consider the line 12 of Figure 3 in the r − th round of the algorithm. Proposition 1. Assume that (1) The index j at line 10 of KSA * is uniformly distributed in {0, ..., N − 1} and independent of i, and (2) if i = j then S[i]+S[j] mod M is independent and uniform in {0, ..., N − 1}. Then, for all elements of Array S, after performing KSA * we have:
Proof. First, we know if i = j then in line 12, we have
Thus, we can find out that all least significant bits of the array S are biased. If the keystream just depended on the array S, then we could exploit the bias to mount a distinguishing attack. But, the keystream output is summation of a word from the array S and the variable k. In addition, the variable k is the sum of randomly chosen elements of the array S. It can be shown that the least significant bit of the variable k is also biased but the bias is very close to zero. So, we need to use combination of outputs to eliminate the effect of variable k and find a biased linear relation. For instance, linear combination of two consecutive outputs can reveal the expected bias. To do this, let the event E denote the condition, in which the relation kt+1 = kt + S[y] is satisfied as follows: We can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In RC(n,m), the probability of
For an ideal PRBG, the above probability would have been exactly
. We can extend our assumption for more than two consecutive output words in which S[x] is not updated in time t = 0 (or t = 0 and t = 1 ). In other words,
The probability of [Output [2] ⊕ Output[1]]0 = 0 can be simply computed by applying Bayes' theorem as follows:
The above attack is a generalisation of the attack proposed in [19, 20] with emphasis on the initialization part of algorithm. In the next section, we will present distinguishing and key recovery attacks, which exploit a low diffusion of bits property of KSA*. Note that the required amount of data to distinguish a biased sequence Z in which P r(Zi = 0) = 1/2 + 1/2 n from a truly random sequence is determined as the Chernoff bound by an exponential function in n is greater than 2 2n ln
where PS is the expected success probability. In Table 2 , we compare the theoretical success probability with the probability obtained by experiments.
The second attack
The second distinguishing attack is based on differential cryptanalysis [2] . Differential attacks on stream ciphers use a chosen initial value or other public variables. This kind of Algorithm 1 Distinguishing Attack on RC4(n, m) Input: The first two (four) output words corresponding 2 4.n randomly chosen secret key. Output: To distinguish between RC4(n, m)' outputs and a truly random source.
is i-th output associated with k-th secret key.
3. If S ≥ 1 2 then the algorithm which is analysed in this test, is RC4(n, m).
attack can be launched, if the adversary has access to the cipher and can manipulate the external (public) elements. But of course, they cannot see the secret elements that are assumed to be hidden by, for example, a tamper proof hardware. We are going to use a generalisation of differential cryptanalysis called the truncated differential cryptanalysis. Whereas the standard differential cryptanalysis considers the full difference between two inputs, the truncated variant takes differences that are only partially determined. So, attacker can predict only some of the bits. As we noted before, a modification of more significant bits will not change less significant bits. This property is rephrased below.
where ∆1 = R10 · · · 0, ∆2 = R20 · · · 0, and R1 = R2, We have:
In modular addition, the most significant bits do not affect the least significant bits. So, applying difference vectors to more significant bits changes just corresponding output bits and the difference for less significant bits will be zero. Proof. For two initial vectors IV1 and IV2, the least significant bytes are the same. According to the lines 9 and 10 in Figure 3 and the lines 6 and 7 in Figure 4 , the indices i and j are all updated modulo 2 8 . So, the index j which depends on the secret key bytes and the least significant bytes of internal state will be the same. Consequently, updating internal state and variable k is similar. However, updating array S and variable k is based on modular addition then changing MSB does not change the least significant bits (see Remark 1 ), then the bits with less significant bits will remain the same.
A distinguishing attack on RC4(8, 32) based on Theorem 1 is shown as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Distinguishing Attack on RC4(8, 32)
Input: Two initial vectors IV1 and IV2 which satisfy Equation 2. Output: To distinguish between RC4(8,32) outputs and a truly random source.
1. Select k elements to apply differential input vectors from set K (|K| = k) and 1 ≤ k < 2 8 .
Select differential vectors ∆IV [i]
= 0xRR000000, i ∈ K and RR are non-zero and arbitrary bytes. 
5. If the general form of ∆Output[j] = 0xSS 00 00 00 where SS is output truncated differential bytes, then the algorithm which is analysed in this test, is RC4(8,32).
Key Recovery Attack on RC4(n,m)
Now, we prove that the attacker is able to recover the secret key of RC4(n, m) by guessing each byte of the secret key separately. There are three phases of our key recovery attack. 
Compute output differential vector as ∆Output
If ∆Output[j] = 0X00 00 00 00, Then SK0 is the least significant byte of secret key with probability close to one. Otherwise, Go to step 1.
Remark 3:
When the attacker finds a SK0 which is confirmed in step 5, then he has to repeat the scenario with same SK0 and different IV1[i] and IV2[i] to be sure the guessed SK0 is the least significant byte of secret key with probability one.
Remark 4:
The attack efficiency does not depend on r parameter. It means that if the designers increase r, the attack will be still applicable.
To recover all bytes of secret key, we just need to perform the above sequences. For example, to recover k − th (0 ≤ k < 32 for 256-bit secret key) byte of secret key, attacker has to find all bytes of SK[i] where 0 ≤ i < k according to Algorithm 4.
To verify theoretical results, we implemented the key recovery attack on RC4 (8, 32) . The attack can recover a 256-bit secret key less than one second in on a standard PC. Also, the attack complexity is not different for other members of RC4(n, m) family. = 0X00 00 00 00, Then SK k is the the k − th byte of secret key with probability close to one. Otherwise, Go to step 1.
Discussion
Thwarting the proposed attacks: The attacks proposed in this paper were based on two critical weak points. The first weakness is the non-randomness property of the internal state after applying KSA*. This weakness is actually a natural attribute of the cipher. The main difference between RC4 and RC4(n, m) is the length of elements of internal i and j are kept fixed. The second weak point is a low diffusion property. This weak point can be removed by using some simple linear operations like bit-rotation to relocate the positions of the least and most significant bits of internal states during running of KSA* and PRGA*.
CONCLUSION
We investigated the security of RC4(n, m) and particularly analysed the initialization part of the algorithm. The attacks in this paper were based on non-randomness of internal state which lead to a statistical distinguishing attack, and based on low diffusion property in KSA* and PRGA* which shows the attacker can apply a truncated differential technique to recover all bytes of the Key array. These attacks are only applicable when the protocol allows manipulation of initial value. In this scenario, we have shown that the output keystream can be distinguished from a truly random sequence with having just 256 output words. By using this weak point, a practical key recovery attack which recovers 256−bit secret key with time complexity about 2 13 algorithm operations has been proposed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Mohammad Ali Orumiehchiha is supported by the Macquarie University MQRES Scholarship. Josef Pieprzyk and Ron Steinfeld are supported by the ARC grant DP0987734.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Banik, S. Maitra, and S. Sarkar. On the evolution of gghn cipher. In Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India,
